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ABSTRACT
There is convincing evidence that the Internet has lowered the prices paid by some consumers in
established industries, for example, term life insurance and car retailing. However, current research
does not reveal much about how using the Internet lowers prices. This paper answers this question
for  the  auto  retailing  industry.  We  use  direct  measures  of  search  behavior  and  consumer
characteristics to investigate how the Internet affects negotiated prices. We show that the Internet
lowers prices for two distinct reasons. First, the Internet helps consumers learn the invoice price of
dealers. Second, the referral process of online buying services, a novel institution made possible by
the Internet, also helps consumers obtain lower prices. The combined information and referral price
effects are -1.5%, corresponding to 22% of dealers' average gross profit margin per vehicle. We also
find that buyers with a high disutility of bargaining benefit from information on the specific car they
eventually purchased while buyers who like the bargaining process do not. The results suggest that
the decisions consumers make to use the Internet to gather information and to use the negotiating
clout of an online buying service have a real effect on the prices paid by these consumers.
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There is convincing evidence that the Internet has lowered the prices paid by some consumers
in established industries. In car retailing, for example, Zettelmeyer, Scott Morton, and Silva-
Risso (2004) show that new vehicle buyers who use the Internet pay 2.2% less for their car
than those who do not, a savings of $500 on the average car. In the insurance industry Brown
and Goolsbee (2002) show that the growth of the Internet has reduced the price of term life
insurance by 8-15%.
While these results are convincing that using the Internet lowers prices, they do not reveal
much about how using the Internet lowers prices. In particular, there are a number of things
a buyer can do with the Internet, including researching product characteristics, making price
comparisons, communicating with sellers, obtaining recommendations from peers, and so on.
Additionally, in some markets, the Internet has made new institutions possible, such as online
buying services, that change price negotiations. We would like to better understand what
aspects of Internet use matter most for the prices paid by consumers.
We will address this question in the context of price negotiations for new vehicles; we
use direct measures of search behavior and consumer characteristics to investigate how the
Internet aﬀects negotiated prices in car retailing. We match transaction data on 1,500 car
purchases in California with the responses to a survey which asks buyers detailed questions
about their Internet usage, their attitudes towards information search and bargaining, and
their demographics.
We have two speciﬁc goals in this paper. The ﬁrst goal is to investigate why the Internet
lowers the prices paid by consumers who use it. We consider two basic reasons. First, the
Internet could be lowering prices by decreasing search cost and thereby making more purchase
relevant information available to consumers who use the Internet. Information can be relevant in
various ways. For example, information about invoice prices allow consumers to better estimate
2the dealer’s reservation price, an important piece of information in negotiations. Lower search
cost may also beneﬁt consumers in their search for low-price dealerships. Because car prices are
negotiated and rarely posted, the Internet is unlikely to help consumer ﬁnd price information
from competing dealerships without engaging in direct negotiation. However, the Internet may
help consumers ﬁnd low-price dealerships because it facilitates an information exchange with
other consumers about the prices they paid at various dealerships. Also, consumers may make
price inferences from dealer websites. To some degree the Internet may be a substitute for
visiting multiple dealers.
The second reason we consider is that the Internet could be lowering prices for some con-
sumers by consolidating their buyer power through online buying services; these institutions
have become widely accessible as a result of the Internet. There is evidence that groups of
buyers should expect to pay lower prices than individual buyers (Snyder 1998). We therefore
expect that consumers who use online buying services will pay lower prices.
The second goal of this paper is to determine whether there is an interaction between
customer characteristics (such as the disutility of bargaining) and the payoﬀs from using the
Internet. We are interested in this question because there is evidence that consumers who
are disadvantaged in the bargaining process are more likely to use the Internet (Zettelmeyer,
Scott Morton, and Silva-Risso 2004). The standard economic argument suggests that a con-
sumer’s propensity to engage in a given behavior should be positively related to their beneﬁt
from doing so. In the present context we therefore expect that consumers with characteristics
which disadvantage them in price negotiations will beneﬁt more from using the Internet. For
example, consumers who dislike the face-to-face bargaining process might beneﬁt more from
getting information from the Internet than consumers who don’t mind bargaining.
We show that the Internet lowers prices for two distinct reasons. First, the Internet informs
consumers. The information that seems to be most valuable to consumers is the invoice price of
the dealer; it enables them to negotiate a low price at a given dealership. Internet information
3seems not to help consumers ﬁnd low-price dealerships. In particular, the Internet does not
substitute for searching at multiple dealers. Second, the referral process of online buying
services, a novel institution made possible by the Internet, helps consumers obtain lower prices.
We believe that online buying services are eﬀective because, unlike manufacturers, they can
exert pressure on dealers by directing incremental business to aﬃliated dealerships—and away
from unaﬃliated dealerships.
Our results show combined information and referral price eﬀects of -1.5%. This corresponds
to 22% of dealers’ average gross proﬁt margin per vehicle. We want to highlight two important
points concerning these results. First, we account for potential selection eﬀects in search and
purchasing behavior by directly controlling for individual buyer characteristics such disutility of
bargaining, willingness to search, and car knowledge. While these controls cannot fully rule out
selection bias, they increase our conﬁdence that the price eﬀects are not an artifact of diﬀerences
in unobserved characteristics between people who choose to use the Internet and those who do
not. Second, the estimates are close to the estimates of -2.2% in Zettelmeyer, Scott Morton,
and Silva-Risso (2004), using a diﬀerent data source, a diﬀerent estimation method, and a
diﬀerent time period.
We also ﬁnd that the beneﬁts of gathering information diﬀers by consumer type. While
buyers with a high disutility of bargaining pay 1.5% less when they have collected information
on the speciﬁc car they eventually purchase than they otherwise would have, buyers who like
the bargaining process do not beneﬁt from such information. This stands in contrast to the
beneﬁts of requesting a referral from an online buying service, which is equal for the two types
of buyers (-0.7%). We have argued above that a referral from an online buying service lowers
prices at a dealer because of the implicit threat an online buying service can make to redirect
customers to the dealer’s competitors if the referral service’s customers are not oﬀered good
prices. Consistent with our ﬁndings, if this threat operates, it seems reasonable that it should
apply uniformly across consumers.
4Our paper is related to prior work analyzing how consumers search for car information.
Ratchford and Srinivasan (1993) use survey data on search and choice behavior from a local
automobile market to estimate returns to search time. Moorthy, Ratchford, and Talukdar
(1997) present a model of total search eﬀort with an emphasis on how prior brand perception
aﬀects the search process. Ratchford, Talukdar, and Lee (2003) analyze how the Internet has
changed consumer search behavior for automobiles by comparing data from 1989 and 1999.
Furse, Punj, and Stewart (1984) use a survey to identify clusters of consumers with diﬀerent
search patterns and ﬁnd that a sizable segment of consumers search very little. Klein and
Ford (2001) replicate this approach for a sample of Internet users. These papers have been
very useful in informing our survey design. This paper represents a substantial extension of
these previous papers on Internet search for automobiles because it combines survey data with
detailed transaction data on purchase outcomes.
This paper is also related to Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2001) and Zettelmeyer,
Scott Morton, and Silva-Risso (2004). These papers are based on a large dataset of transac-
tion prices for new cars which is then combined with information on Internet usage from a
large online buying service (Autobytel.com). The ﬁrst paper provides an overview of Internet
car retailing. The second paper controls for selection and shows that using Autobytel.com
reduces price by approximately 2.2%. Neither paper addresses the research questions in the
present paper. This is because the data used in these papers only contains a single search-
or Internet-related explanatory variable, which is whether a consumer used the online buying
service Autobytel.com. This service both informs consumers and allows them to submit an
online referral. Without other explanatory variables measuring, for example, the extent to
which consumers were informed from other sources, these papers cannot determine the eﬀects
of diﬀerent search and purchasing activities. For the same reason these paper cannot disentan-
gle whether consumers save from using the Internet because they become better informed, or
because online buying services change the way price negotiations are conducted.
5Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2004) use the same dataset here to test predic-
tions from bargaining theory about how private information, patience, and bargaining disutility
aﬀect the division of surplus between negotiating parties. That paper has no measures of In-
ternet use and does not consider the role of the Internet for car negotiations.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the survey and transaction data. Section 3
analyzes the diﬀerent ways in which the Internet lowers prices. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Data
Our data come from two sources. The ﬁrst source is a survey instrument which we mailed to
5250 consumers who purchased one of eight popular new car models in California during April
and May 2002. We match the individual survey data to transaction data from a data supplier
in the automotive industry (henceforth DSA).
2.1 Survey data
Survey instrument: The survey asked questions about (1) the number of dealers a buyer
visited, (2) the buyer’s negotiation strategy, (3) the oﬄine and online sources of information the
buyer used, (4) the information the buyer learned at each of these information sources, (5) the
referrals the buyer requested, (6) demographics, and (7) personal attitudes towards bargaining
and information search. A copy of the survey can be found in the appendix.
Sample: We chose our sample by car type and then mailed the survey to every buyer of
the selected car types for whom we had transaction data in April and May 2002. The ﬁrst
objective in selecting car types was to include a variety of car categories (e.g. midsize sedan,
luxury sedan, pickup, SUV, etc.). The second objective in selecting car types was to keep the
number of diﬀerent cars small in order to be able to control for car ﬁxed eﬀects without losing
too many degrees of freedom. We deﬁned a “car” as the interaction of make, model, body
6type, transmission, displacement, doors, cylinders, and trim level (for example, one “car” is a
2002 Honda Accord sedan with automatic transmission, a 2.2 liter engine, 4 doors, 4 cylinders,
and the EX trim). We added the purchases of the most common “cars” for a variety of car
categories until we reached our desired sample size. This yielded the most popular variants of
Honda Accord, Chrysler PT Cruiser, Nissan Altima, Chevrolet Silverado, Toyota Corolla, Jeep
Grand Cherokee, Honda Odyssey, and Chevrolet Tahoe.
Procedure: Each potential respondent received three mailings. The ﬁrst mailing contained
a letter announcing the arrival of the survey, introducing ourselves as the researchers and
explaining the purpose of the project. The second mailing was sent out 5 days later and
contained a cover letter, the survey, a pre-stamped return envelope, and a $1 bill. The third
mailing was sent out 5 days after the second mailing and consisted of a postcard thanking
buyers for their participation and reminding them to return the survey.
The survey design, including the cover letter, multiple mailings, and token thanks of the
enclosed dollar bill, appeared to be very eﬀective at encouraging response. Of the 5250 we sent,
2470 were returned completed or partially completed, for a response rate of 47%.
Response issues: In cases in which the answer to a question was missing but could be easily
inferred from a followup question we ﬁlled in the answer. For example, if a buyer did not answer
whether she had used the Internet but proceeded to detail the types of sites she had visited
we ﬁlled in that she had used the Internet. We also corrected two inconsistencies in the way
surveys were ﬁlled out. The ﬁrst correction concerns a question about the respondent having
collected information about the car he or she eventually purchased. We corrected answers for
which there were two ways to determine that the answer was erroneous. For example, if a
person indicated he had researched zero cars and also spent zero hours doing research online
and zero oﬄine, then we did not allow him to be have “collected information about the car
he/she eventually purchased.” The second correction concerns the question of whether the
respondent had in any way used the Internet in conjunction with buying a car. For example,
7some buyers checked oﬀ that they did not use the Internet to search for a car but then continued
to indicate which websites they had visited for research. In this case we changed the answer
on the internet use question to “yes.”1
In survey based research it is normally diﬃcult to assess how respondents and non-respondents
diﬀer along relevant dimensions. In our case this assessment is easier: since we have transaction
data for respondents and non-respondents alike, we can compare these two groups along any
variable we observe in the transaction data. First, we can compare the census-based demo-
graphic information associated with the census block groups in which buyers reside. Assuming
that these census based measures are representative of individual buyers’ demographics, non-
respondents are signiﬁcantly (at the 5% level) less likely to be college graduates (27% vs.
31%), more likely to be high school drop-outs (18% vs. 13.5%), more likely to be Hispanic or
black (20% and 5% vs. 16% and 4%, respectively), have lower household incomes ($55,000 vs.
$59,000), and own less valuable houses ($214,000 vs. $228,000). There is no statistically signif-
icant diﬀerence between the two groups in the percentage of buyers who are identiﬁed as female
on the basis of their ﬁrst name. Second, we can compare how respondents and non-respondents
diﬀer with regards to behavioral measures contained in the transaction data. With regards
to price—the dependent variable used in this study—there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
respondents and non-respondents at the 5% level. Neither do we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the dealer proﬁtability of purchases by respondents and by non-respondents.
We are not concerned about the demographic diﬀerences between respondents and non-
respondents. This is for two reasons. First, the diﬀerences do not seem large enough for
respondents and non-respondents to diﬀer signiﬁcantly with respect to our dependent variable
(or other transaction-based behavioral measures). Second, in our previous research we have
1Our conclusions are unaﬀected by these corrections. To test for robustness, we repeated all speciﬁcations
in the paper with a dataset from which we dropped the inconsistent 71 survey responses. We also repeated
all speciﬁcations with a dataset which was left completely unaltered. While the magnitude of coeﬃcients vary
slightly between datasets, our substantive ﬁndings are unchanged.
8found that it is the poorest, least educated buyers who pay most for a car, ceteris paribus.
These are precisely the buyers who were least likely to respond to our survey (although the
diﬀerence in prices paid by these buyers compared to respondents is not large enough to be
statistically signiﬁcant). Thus, since our results rely on between-consumer diﬀerences in prices
paid due to diﬀerences in search and purchase behavior, price diﬀerences are likely to be smaller
within respondents than within the general population. Consequently, our results are likely to
be a conservative lower bound of the true beneﬁts of searching and using the Internet.
Basic survey ﬁndings: Seventy-two percent of respondents reported that they used the In-
ternet in some way to help them shop for a new vehicle. The most frequently visited site by
buyers who reported using the Internet were manufacturer websites (70%). Internet consumers
also frequently visited informational websites such as consumerreports.com or kbb.com (63%),
followed by online buying services such as Autobytel.com or Carsdirect.com (56%) and indi-
vidual dealer websites (31%). Only 6% of buyers who used the Internet collected information
via chat rooms or bulletin boards. 78% of buyers who had used the Internet responded that
they had explicitly mentioned that fact to the dealer.
Internet users report having collected information on more car types than buyers who did
not use the Internet. The median buyer who used the Internet collected information for 2-3
cars whereas the median oﬄine buyer only collected information for 1 car. Most strikingly, only
52% of buyers who did not use the Internet said that they had collected information (from any
source) speciﬁcally on the vehicle they ended up buying. This contrasts with 95% for buyers
who used the Internet. Across both groups the average is 82%.
2.2 Transaction data
DSA collects transaction data from a sample of dealers in the major metropolitan areas in the
US. These data include some customer information, the make, model and trim level of the car,
ﬁnancing information, trade-in information, dealer-added extras, and the proﬁtability of the
9transaction to the dealership.
The price observed in the dataset is the price that the customer pays for the vehicle including
factory installed accessories and options and the dealer-installed accessories contracted for at
the time of sale that contribute to the resale value of the car.2 The Price variable we use as
the dependent variable is this price, minus the ManufacturerRebate, if any, given directly to the
consumer, and minus what is known as the TradeInOverAllowance. TradeInOverAllowance is
the diﬀerence between the trade-in price paid by the dealer to the consumer and the wholesale
value of the speciﬁc trade-in vehicle (as estimated by the dealer). We adjust for this amount
to account for the possibility, for example, that a dealer may oﬀer a consumer a low price for
the new car because the dealer is proﬁting from the trade-in.
We control for car ﬁxed eﬀects according to the deﬁnition of a “car” above. While our car
ﬁxed eﬀects will control for many of the factors that contribute to the price of a car, it will not
control for the factory- and dealer-installed options which vary within trim level. The price we
observe covers such options but we do not observe what options the car actually has. In order
to control for price diﬀerences attributable to options, we include as an explanatory variable
the percent deviation of the dealer’s cost of purchasing the vehicle from the average vehicle cost
of that car in the dataset. This percent deviation, called VehicleCost will be positive when the
car has an unobserved option (for example a CD player) and is therefore relatively expensive
compared to other examples of the same car. Our measure of price also takes into account any
variation in holdback and transportation charges.
To control for time variation in prices, we deﬁne a dummy EndOfMonth that equals 1 if the
car was sold within the last 5 days of the month. This dummy accounts for the fact that sales
people get bonuses when they fulﬁll monthly sales quotas, changing their incentive to hold out
for a high price. A dummy variable WeekEnd speciﬁes whether the car was purchased on a
2Dealer-installed accessories that contribute to the resale value include items such as upgraded tires or a
sound system, but would exclude options such as undercoating or waxing.
10Saturday or Sunday to control for whether consumers who buy cars on weekends are diﬀerent
from other consumers in ways that are otherwise unobserved. In addition, we include a dummy
for the second month in our 2-month sample period to control for other seasonal eﬀects.
We control for the competitiveness of each dealer’s market. For each dealership we count
the number of dealerships with the same nameplate that fall in a zip code that is within a
10 mile radius of the zip code of the focal dealership. We take into account cases where one
owner owns several franchises in close proximity so that our measure counts only the number
of separately-controlled entities.
We also supplement the demographic information from the survey with census data that
DSA matches with the buyer’s address from the transaction record. The data is on the level of
a “block group,” which makes up about one fourth of the area and population of a census tract.
On average, block groups have about 1100 people in them. Finally, we control for whether the
car was sold in Northern or Southern California.
Combining the two datasets results in 1,436 observations. This is smaller than the number
of returned surveys because of missing information in the transaction dataset and some only
partially completed surveys.
3 Results
We now proceed to using the direct measures of search behavior and consumer characteristics
to investigate how the Internet lowers negotiated prices in car retailing. Our dependent variable
is Price as deﬁned in the data section. In order to provide the appropriate baseline for the
price of the car, we use a standard hedonic regression of log price. We work in logs because
the price eﬀect of many of the attributes of the car, such as being sold in Northern California
or in May, are likely to be better modeled as a percentage of the car’s value than a ﬁxed dollar
increment. We estimate the following speciﬁcation:
11ln(Pricei) = Xiα + Diβ + Siγ + i
The X matrix is composed of transaction and car variables: car, month, and region ﬁxed
eﬀects, car costs, and controls for whether the car was purchased at the end of month or
the weekend, and whether the buyer traded in a vehicle. The D matrix contains demographic
characteristics of the buyer and her census block group (see Table 1 in the appendix for summary
statistics). We use demographic information on gender, age, education, income, and race from
the survey. We use information on house ownership, median house value, and type of occupation
in the census block group in which the buyer resides. We control for these demographic variables
because we know from Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2003) that they are related
to negotiated car prices. In addition, these variables are also correlated with the search and
purchasing behavior we intend to analyze in this paper; their inclusion is thus critical to avoid
bias in the coeﬃcients of interest.3 To this basic speciﬁcation we add a matrix S which contains
survey responses that indicate the search behavior and Internet use of a buyer.
We begin our investigation of the role of the Internet by including an indicator to the
speciﬁcation which is one if a buyer answered “yes” to the question “Did you use the Internet
in any way to help you shop for a new vehicle? (e.g. to research vehicles, ﬁnd a dealer, etc.).”
We refer to this indicator as InternetUse (see column 1 in Table 2). We ﬁnd that buyers who
reported having used the Internet in any way to help them shop for a new vehicle pay on
average 1.16% less than other buyers (p-value < 0.001).
While this describes the average diﬀerence in the prices paid by Internet users and non-
users, respectively, this average likely does not measure the expected return to a customer of
3For example, education is good predictor of Internet usage. Only 37% of buyers who reported not to have
a high school degree used the Internet. This is in contrast to 81% of buyers with a college degree or higher.
Also, 87% percent of buyers with income above $150,000 but only 47% of buyers with income between $20,000
and $29,999 reported using the Internet for car buying. We will not discuss the estimated coeﬃcients on the
demographics in this paper because they are not the focus of the study. The interested reader is referred to
Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2003) for a detailed analysis of the eﬀects of demographics on the
price of a new car. For another approach on the eﬀect of demographics on bargaining outcomes see Chen, Yang,
and Zhao (2003).
12deciding to use the Internet. The reason is that the average eﬀect on price likely includes eﬀects
caused by unobserved customer traits (such as being a “smart shopper”) which happen to be
correlated with using the Internet.
Is the Internet eﬀect driven by unobserved diﬀerences between online and oﬄine
consumers?
In order to estimate the “treatment eﬀect” of using the Internet, in this section we run the same
speciﬁcation as above, but this time we control for consumer types. We are able to (imperfectly)
measure normally “unobserved” consumer types by asking our consumers particular questions
on the survey. While controlling for these measures cannot rule out that some of the Internet
eﬀect remains driven by unobserved diﬀerences between consumers, we measure consumers
characteristics which we ex-ante believe best predict consumers’ underlying propensity to search
for purchase-relevant information and to use the Internet.4
We ask consumers to rate their agreement or disagreement with a list of statements to
get a measure of three consumer traits.5 These traits are (1) whether a consumer has a
high willingness to search, (2) whether a consumer is a car enthusiast, and (3) whether a
consumer has a high disutility of bargaining. To get answers that are reliable and as comparable
as possible across respondents we ask survey participants questions about their behavior or
attitudes, not about the traits directly. For example, we are interested in the “car enthusiast”
trait to control for whether a consumer knows a lot about cars, even if they did little or no
search for their car purchase. We could have asked a survey participant to agree or disagree
with the statement “I am a car enthusiast,” thereby leaving it up the respondent to decide
what a car enthusiast is. Instead, we get more consistent answers by asking “I read car- and/or
4At then end of section 4 we show that these consumer characteristics are indeed correlated with Internet use.
This is also true for some other independent variables of interest (not reported). Since our measures of consumer
characteristics are also related to the prices paid by consumers, this shows the importance of controlling for
these characteristics in subsequent speciﬁcations in order to avoid biased estimates.
5These measures were chosen based on our prior research ﬁndings, and discussions with car and internet
industry experts.
13truck-enthusiast magazines regularly” and “I tend to visit dealers whenever a new model is
introduced.”6 Similarly, we get at consumers’ willingness to search with statements such as
“I do a lot of price comparison when making large purchases,” “I am the kind of person who
gathers as much information as possible before visiting car dealers,” and “I frequently use the
Internet to obtain information about products I am interested in.” Finally, to assess whether
a consumer derives a high disutility from the bargaining process we present consumers with
the statements “I am afraid that I will be taken advantage of by a dealer when negotiating the
price of a new car,” and “It is hard for me to ﬁnd time to shop for a new vehicle.” We assume
that consumers who feel very vulnerable will dislike bargaining more than consumers who do
not feel vulnerable. The response to the second statement measures the consumer’s assessment
of her opportunity cost of being engaged in a bargaining interaction.7
To investigate how our survey questions map into the three consumer traits they are in-
tended to measure we employ a factor analysis. Three factors have eigenvalues above 1 and
their interpretation corresponds exactly to our three consumer traits. The ﬁrst factor—with
high factor loadings on the three “willingness to search” questions8—has an eigenvalue of 1.99
and explains 28% of the variation in the seven items. The second factor—with high factor
loadings on the two “car enthusiast” questions—has an eigenvalue of 1.51 and explains 22% of
the variation in the seven items. The third factor—with high factor loadings on the two “bar-
6Note that these questions may not entirely overcome our concerns associated with asking consumers questions
with vague terms. In particular, some of our questions involve an implicit norm that may diﬀer between, for
example, Internet-based and other buyers. This is a limitation of our survey which we cannot overcome at this
time.
7The consumer traits we construct are based in part on a consumer’s own assessment of his or her bargaining
ability. These assessments are made 6-12 weeks after the consumers purchased a car. If consumers infer their
bargaining ability from the price they obtained for this particular vehicle, there could be an endogeneity between
prices and consumer traits. If this is the case, too much of the price eﬀect will be attributed to consumer traits
and too little to other factors, such as information search. While this endogeneity is of concern, since the primary
purpose of the consumer traits is to function as control variables, we believe such endogeneity biases the results
against our main ﬁndings.
8The rotated factor loadings (varimax rotation) for the ﬁrst factor are 0.82 for DoPriceComparisons, 0.72 for
InternetForInfo, and 0.85 for GatherMuchInfo. For the second factor, corresponding to“car enthusiast,” the fac-
tor loadings are 0.85 for ReadCarMagazine, and 0.84 for VisitDealerForFun. For the third factor, corresponding
to “bargaining disutility,” the factor loadings are 0.73 for AfraidTakenAdvantage, and 0.78 for NoTimeToShop.
14gaining disutility” questions—has an eigenvalue of 1.09 and explains 16% of the variation in the
seven items. The reliability of the measures is as follows: Cronbach’s alpha for the three “will-
ingness to search” questions is 0.7; the correlation coeﬃcient for the two two-question scales is
0.45 (p-value < 0.001) for “willingness to search” and 0.18 (p-value < 0.001) for “bargaining
disutility.”
We begin with speciﬁcations which include the answers to the individual consumer trait
questions directly in the regression (later, in section 3.2 we will use the factors). We repeat the
speciﬁcation in column 1 of Table 2, adding these measures of “unobserved” consumer traits.
The coeﬃcient on InternetUse decreases from −1.16 to −0.98 (p-value 0.01, see column 2 in
Table 2). Consumer traits are related to price as follows: buyers who were more afraid of
being taken advantage of by the dealer pay more, suggesting that they had reason to be afraid.
Consumers who agree more with the statement “I do a lot of price comparison when making
large purchases” pay less (p-value 0.10). Other consumer trait variables are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. This reﬂects one consequence of our approach to include all consumer trait
variables in the regression. Since several of the questions are, by design, quite similar they may
be only jointly signiﬁcant. Hence we test the hypothesis that the subset of variables which
measure each consumer trait are jointly zero. We reject the hypothesis that the variables mea-
suring consumers’ disutility of bargaining (AfraidTakenAdvantage, NoTimeToShop) are jointly
zero (p-value 0.001). We also reject the hypothesis that the variables measuring consumers’
willingness to search (DoPriceComparisons, InternetForInfo, GatherMuchInfo) are jointly zero
(p-value 0.05). We cannot reject the hypothesis that the variables measuring whether a con-
sumer is a car enthusiast (ReadCarMagazine, VisitDealerForFun) are zero (p-value 0.43).
We conclude that the Internet eﬀect is unlikely to result from diﬀerences between online
and oﬄine consumers in their demographics, their bargaining disutility, their willingness to
search, or their knowledge about cars; buyers who have used the Internet pay approximately
151% less, even after controlling for demographics and (normally unobserved) consumer traits.9
This corresponds to 15% of dealers’ average gross proﬁt margin per vehicle.
Does Internet use serve as a signal to dealers?
While we have shown above that the Internet eﬀect seems not to be the result of measurable
diﬀerences between online and oﬄine consumers, it could still be that the Internet discount
results from the perception of dealers that Internet consumers are diﬀerent. We can analyze
this question because we asked consumers whether they had mentioned to the dealer that they
used the Internet to do research. If the Internet saves consumers money because dealers assume
that consumers who used the Internet are diﬀerent from “regular” consumers, we should ﬁnd
that the Internet eﬀect should diﬀer between consumers who told the dealer they had used the
Internet and consumers who did not.10 No consumer in our sample reported telling the dealer
that they had used the Internet when, in fact, they had not. We repeat the speciﬁcation in
column 2 of Table 2 an indicator variable ToldDealer which is one if a buyer who used the
Internet told that dealer that she used the Internet to do research (unreported). We cannot
reject the hypothesis that consumers who used the Internet and told the dealer that they had
done so paid on average the same price for a new car as consumers who did not tell the dealer
about their Internet use (the coeﬃcient on ToldDealer is 0.14, p-value 0.70).
Based on the results of this and the previous discussion we conclude that, based on the
survey measures at our disposal, the Internet eﬀect is unlikely to result from actual or dealer-
perceived diﬀerences between online and oﬄine consumers. We are now interested in determin-
ing the mechanism by which the Internet lowers the prices paid by consumers.
9Another way to control for selection would be to instrument for Internet use. Regrettably, it is very diﬃcult
to ﬁnd instruments that are correlated with Internet use and uncorrelated with the prices consumers pay for
cars. This is because prices are individually negotiated and thus a function of consumer characteristics which are
also likely to predict Internet use. Hence, it is very diﬃcult to argue that there are measures that could be used
to predict Internet use in the ﬁrst-step selection equation, but should be excluded from the price equation. This
is why we have chosen the alternative “selection on observables” approach by eliciting normally unobservable
consumer characteristics through a survey instrument.
10This argument is not valid if dealers can tell whether a consumers used the Internet, irrespective of whether
consumers inform the dealer.
163.1 The role of the Internet
In the results so far, we have shown that Internet usage leads to prices that are lower by about
1% and that this is not, insofar as we can tell, because Internet users and non-users diﬀer on
observable demographic characteristics or on individual traits which our survey allows us to
observe. The aim of this paper, however, goes beyond showing that Internet usage does indeed
have a “treatment eﬀect.” Our aim is to “unpack” this treatment eﬀect – to understand what
it is about what consumers are doing online that leads to lower prices. We ﬁrst consider the
eﬀect the Internet has on prices by aiding consumers in obtaining information.
Does the Internet lower prices by facilitate purchase-relevant information search?
Our aim in this subsection is to estimate how much of the eﬀect of InternetUse on prices is
attributable to a consumer being better informed. To do so we make use of the fact that
in the survey we ask whether a consumer obtained information about the speciﬁc vehicle she
eventually purchased. This enables us to observe whether a consumer is informed independently
of whether she used the Internet. This is because Informed includes both consumers who
gathered information entirely oﬄine, and consumers who used the Internet, but not to obtain
information about the speciﬁc car they purchased. By comparing the eﬀect of Informed with
the eﬀect of InternetUse we can get some sense of how much of the Internet usage eﬀect on
price is due to being better informed.
We begin with a speciﬁcation in which – instead of InternetUse – we include the indicator
Informed for whether the buyer collected information speciﬁc to the vehicle that she ended
up purchasing (see column 3 of Table 2). We ﬁnd that buyers who reported having collected
information for the type of car they eventually purchased pay on average 0.74% less than other
buyers (p-value 0.06). This is somewhat smaller than the coeﬃcient of 0.98% for InternetUse.
In an unreported speciﬁcation with both variables, Informed becomes insigniﬁcant (p-value
0.26) while the InternetUse coeﬃcient changes to -0.81 (p-value 0.045). The similar eﬀect of
17the two variables and a high and signiﬁcant correlation coeﬃcient of 0.5 suggests that becoming
better informed is an important part of the advantage of using the Internet.
How is Internet information helping buyers?
Having found that information is an important part of how the Internet helps consumers in
negotiating lower prices, we would like to know how the information is helping. In particular,
we consider two possible hypotheses. First, consumers could be beneﬁtting from using the
Internet because doing so provides them with information that helps them better negotiate
with a dealer. Second, consumers could be beneﬁtting from using the Internet because doing
so helps them ﬁnd low-price dealers.
We begin by investigating what kind of information matters most in price negotiations. We
asked respondents what information they researched on the Internet, including “which car to
purchase,” “which dealers to visit or buy from,” “dealer cost (invoice/hold-back),” or the “fair
price or market value.” We ﬁnd that the only piece of information that aﬀects transaction price
is the invoice price of the car. Consumers who have collected information about the invoice
price of the car they wish to buy pay on average 0.61% less than other buyers (p-value 0.04,
see column 4 in Table 2).11 Since the invoice price of a dealer is closely related to the dealer’s
reservation price for a speciﬁc vehicle, our result implies that, on average, consumers who have
better information about a dealer’s reservation price will do better in price negotiations than
consumers who are uninformed. This ﬁnding is consistent with predictions from the game-
theoretic literature on bargaining with incomplete information (see Chatterjee and Samuelson
(1983) for a static model, Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985) and Gul, Sonnenschein, and
Wilson (1986) for dynamic buyer-oﬀer models, and Ausubel and Deneckere (1998) for a dy-
namic alternating-oﬀer model which generate this prediction).12 Overall, consumers seem to
11This result is not due to collinearity between the four information variables. We obtain the same result if we
run four separate speciﬁcations, each of which contains all controls but only one of the four information variables
at a time (not reported).
12See Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso (2004) for a more detailed literature review.
18be beneﬁtting from using the Internet because it provides them with information that helps
them better negotiate with a dealer.
In contrast, we can ﬁnd no evidence that consumers are beneﬁtting from using the Internet
because doing so helps them ﬁnd low-price dealers. For many non-car products, the Internet
makes it possible to compare prices oﬀered by competing retailers either by checking multiple
sites or with a price comparison site such as MySimon.com. Since dealer franchise laws require
cars to be sold through dealerships and since almost all dealerships engage in price negotiation,
this kind of direct price comparison is not possible for cars. However, we can observe in our
data that some dealers do oﬀer consistently lower prices than others. While it is possible that
consumers may be able to learn this information, for example, in an online discussion forum or
by inference from a dealer’s own website, we ﬁnd no evidence in our data that this is occurring
to any signiﬁcant degree.
We can see this in several speciﬁcations. First, in column 4 in Table 2, a response indicating
that a consumers has collected information on “which dealers to visit or buy from” has no
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the price. Another way of testing whether the Internet eﬀect
is due to consumers ﬁnding low-price dealerships is to add dealer ﬁxed eﬀects to the core
speciﬁcation in column 2 in Table 2. In this unreported regression, the estimated coeﬃcient
on the InternetUse variable is identiﬁed by within-dealer variation in whether consumers are
informed or not. Since identiﬁcation in this speciﬁcation does not rely on diﬀerences in average
price levels between dealers, the results cannot be due to consumers searching for low-price
dealerships. The coeﬃcient on InternetUse remains signiﬁcant and negative at -0.81% (p-value
0.04).
A third way of investigating whether the Internet is used to gather information that helps
consumers ﬁnd low-price dealers is to test whether InternetUse substitutes for search among
dealers. We asked buyers how many other dealerships they visited. If we add the number of
visited dealers to the core speciﬁcation in column 2 in Table 2, each increase in response scale
19category for the number of visited dealers decreases price by 0.34% (p-value 0.02, regression
unreported). Most importantly, the coeﬃcient on InternetUse remains signiﬁcant and changes
little (-0.85%, p-value 0.03). The fact that each variable appears to inﬂuence negotiated prices
when both are included in the regression suggests that dealer search and InternetUse are not
performing exactly the same role.
The results in this subsection suggests that Internet information helps consumers by en-
abling them to negotiate a low price at a given dealership. However, Internet information seems
not to help car buyers ﬁnd low-price dealerships.
We now want to know whether the Internet serves any additional role in lowering prices
for consumers. We explore this question by distinguishing among the diﬀerent ways in which
consumers can use the Internet. In particular, we distinguish between manufacturer websites,
individual dealer websites, online buying services, informational websites, and chat rooms. For
each type of online source we construct an indicator that is one if a buyer used that source of
information. Column 5 in Table 2 reports a speciﬁcation that contains #DealersVisited, and
the indicators for how the Internet was used. We ﬁnd that online buying services are the only
type of online site which is associated with lower price.13 The coeﬃcient is -0.90 and highly
signiﬁcant (p-value 0.001). This leads us to investigate the role of online buying services next.
How are online buying services helping buyers?
Online buying services and manufacturer websites diﬀer from other online sources in that
they go beyond providing information to consumers. All online buying services and many
manufacturer websites allow consumers to request a quote from a dealer. The dealer typically
calls or e-mails the referred consumer within 24-48 hours with a price quote. A consumer can
ask for a price quote in a few seconds on a website, and receive it in his or her home the
next day. This raises the question of whether some of the savings from using the Internet
13This result is not due to collinearity between the ﬁve variables describing how consumers use the Internet.
We obtain the same result if we run ﬁve separate speciﬁcations, each of which contains all controls but only one
of the ﬁve information variables at a time (not reported).
20could be driven by a mechanism that is distinct from informing customers, namely the referral
process. To investigate the eﬀect of utilizing the referral process, we add to the basic Internet
speciﬁcation with #DealersVisited an indicator that is one if a consumers answered “yes” to the
question “Did you submit a formal request to any online buying service (e.g. Autobytel.com,
Carpoint.com, Autoweb.com) to be referred to one of the site’s aﬃliated dealers?” We also add
an indicator that is one if a consumers answered “yes” to the equivalent question for referrals
from manufacturer websites.
We ﬁnd that submitting a referral to an independent online buying service is associated
with 0.72% lower prices, in addition to the savings of 0.76% (p-value 0.05) associated with
using the Internet (see column 6 in Table 2). Manufacturer referrals, in contrast, have no eﬀect
on price.
This result is very important because it indicates that there is some important aspect of the
business model of independent referral sites that drives the diﬀerence. The major diﬀerence
between a referral from an online buying service and from a manufacturer is that the manufac-
turer refers consumers to the closest dealer selected from the entirety of its dealerships while
online buying services sign contracts with only a subset of dealers. For example, out of the
approximately 22,000 dealers in the US, Autobytel.com in the ﬁrst quarter of 2001 contracted
with 5,000 dealerships. Online buying services assign dealers exclusive territories, and refer all
customers within that territory who submit a purchase referral for the dealer’s nameplate to
that dealer. Since only a subset of dealers are aﬃliated with a given online buying service, this
dealer’s exclusive territory will be larger than the territory in which it is the closest dealer of
that nameplate. This implies that referrals from an online buying service will more often be
incremental to the dealership’s regular customers than referrals from manufacturers. Manufac-
turers will refer to dealers only customers for whom the dealer is already the closest dealer of
that nameplate. Provided the incremental stream of customers generated by the online buying
service is valuable to the dealership, the dealership has an incentive to quote prices low enough
21to convert a substantial number of referrals into sales. This is because online buying services
monitor the percentage of referrals that result in a sale, and if the percentage is too low, the
dealer may be terminated and replaced by another dealer in that area. The implied threat is
not only that incremental sales get lost, but also that the replacement dealer will then “steal”
some of the dealership’s own consumers. Such a threat is not available to manufacturers.
This argument bears resemblance to that of Klein and Murphy (1988) and Klein (1995) on
contractual provisions in franchising. Klein (1995) argues that three elements are necessary
for the loss of future rents to be a credible threat for a franchisee: (1) the contract between
the franchisor and franchisee must leave downstream rents for the franchisee, (2) the franchisor
must be allowed to monitor the performance of the franchisee, and (3) the franchisor must
be able to easily drop the franchisee. These condition are similar to what we observe for
the contracts between online buying services and their aﬃliated dealers: (1) Dealers are given
exclusive “online territories” which are substantially larger than their oﬄine territories, thereby
creating incremental proﬁts for dealers, (2) online buying services monitor the performance
of dealers with customer satisfaction surveys, and (3) online buying services can easily drop
dealerships from their roster. This interpretation of the role of exclusive territories is diﬀerent
from the one hypothesized by Chen, Iyer, and Padmanabhan (2002). In their paper online
buying services grant exclusivity to dealers to avoid Bertrand-type competition among dealers.
In contrast, our argument and that of Klein (1995) suggests that exclusivity is granted in order
to ensure dealer performance, which in this context means oﬀering lower prices to consumers.
In a sense, independent online buying services bargain with dealers on behalf of a large group
of consumers, although that group is not yet formed. With this interpretation our result is also
consistent with the theoretical predictions of Snyder (1998) who shows why groups of buyers
should expect to pay lower prices to a seller than individual buyers.
In summary, buyers who use the Internet to shop for a car seem to be paying lower prices
for two distinct reasons. First, they become on average better informed than other buyers.
22This information gives consumers better knowledge of of a dealer’s opportunity cost, which
tends to lower the transaction price the consumer pays. Second, buyers seem to be able to take
advantage of any pressure that online buying services exert on dealers through their ability to
direct customers among dealers. The total Internet eﬀect is 1.5% of the purchase price, or 22%
of dealers’s average gross proﬁt margin.14
3.2 Does the Internet beneﬁt all consumers equally?
Next, we investigate whether the information and referral eﬀects accrue to all buyers equally.
In particular we are interested in whether the Internet “levels the playing ﬁeld” by improving
outcomes by more for individuals who would do worse without the Internet. In this paper,
we can examine this question because in our survey we ask explicitly about indicators that
an individual is at a bargaining disadvantage and we observe a range of car-purchase related
Internet activities.
In the survey, we ask respondents to rate their agreement with the statements “I am afraid
that I will be taken advantage of by a dealer when negotiating the price of a new car” and
“It is hard for me to ﬁnd time to shop for a car.” We believe there are a number of char-
acteristics that might lead an individual to strongly agree with the ﬁrst statement, including
aversion to conﬂict, dislike of stressful situations, or anxiety in high-pressure environments.
Instead of trying to assess these elements independently, we ask for a summary assessment that
describes the consumer’s level of apprehension about the bargaining process. In addition, we
also ask whether individuals have a time constraint that would make participation in extended
negotiations costly for them. We expect that both aspects will make the bargaining process
unattractive and lead to less desirable outcomes for consumers.
14We provide one additional piece of evidence to show that the “Internet eﬀect” can be broken into a referral
and an informational component. In a regression that controls for the referral eﬀect, the variable InternetUse and
the variable Informed are almost interchangeable (see column 6 and 7 in Table 2). The InternetUse coeﬃcient
is estimated at -0.76 in the ﬁrst column (p-value 0.05). The second speciﬁcation no longer includes InternetUse
but yields a coeﬃcient estimate of -0.67 for Informed (p-value 0.09). The eﬀect of a referral is similar in the two
speciﬁcations.
23We use the responses to these statements to create an indicator variable, DislikeBargain-
ing, which is one if a buyer derives a higher disutility from the bargaining process than the
median buyer. We derive this indicator using two diﬀerent approaches. In our ﬁrst approach
we construct a variable which is the sum of the normalized values of the responses to the two
statements.15 We then create an indicator which is one for a buyer with a higher value on
this variable than the median buyer. We run a speciﬁcation in which we include DislikeBar-
gaining on its own and also interacted with both InternetUse and OBSReferral (see column 1
in Table 3). We ﬁnd that consumers who DislikeBargaining pay 2.1% more than consumers
who do not (p-value < 0.001). We also ﬁnd that consumers who obtained a referral from an
online buying service pay 0.83% less than those who do not (p-value 0.07); these savings accrue
equally to buyers who do and do not DislikeBargaining. (The DislikeBargaining-OBSReferral
interaction term is statistically zero.) Using the Internet, however, only beneﬁts consumers who
dislike bargaining (by 1.7%, p-value 0.01); consumers who like to bargain (presumably because
they are good bargainers) do not beneﬁt from using the Internet other than by obtaining a
referral.
To ensure the robustness of these ﬁndings we use the factor BargainingDisutility from the
factor analysis on page 15 to derive our indicator variable. We redeﬁne our indicator to be one
if a buyer derives a higher BargainingDisutility than the median buyer.
We repeat the previous speciﬁcation, however, instead of including the consumer trait mea-
sures directly, we make use of the factors WillingnessToSearch and CarEnthusiast to control
for consumer types. The results are similar to the previous speciﬁcation (see column 2 in Ta-
ble 3). We ﬁnd that consumers who DislikeBargaining pay 2.0% more than consumers who do
not. We also ﬁnd that consumers who obtained a request from an online buying service pay
0.74% less than those who do not (p-value 0.10); again these savings accrue equally to buyers
15For each variable we calculate the mean and standard deviation over all respondents. Then we normalize
the answer for each individual by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation.
24who do and do not DislikeBargaining. As before we ﬁnd that using the Internet only beneﬁts
consumers who dislike bargaining (by 1.5%); consumers who like to bargain or have the time
to do so do not beneﬁt from using the Internet other than by obtaining a referral. The sum of
the marginal Internet eﬀects is shown in the following table.
Likes bargaining Dislikes bargaining
Used Internet for information
(but did not request referral)
0% -1.5%
In addition, requested referral -0.7% -0.7%
Total Internet eﬀect -0.7% -2.2%
Our ﬁrst result of this section is that buyers who dislike the bargaining process beneﬁt much
more from being informed. This suggests that the eﬀect of the Internet’s information provision
role is, at least in car buying, to move consumers towards a more level playing ﬁeld in terms of
bargaining ability. Indeed, individuals who do not dislike bargaining do not appear to beneﬁt
at all from being better informed by the Internet. One can argue that, colloquially, this is the
very deﬁnition of being a good bargainer: to be able to do well without knowing much about
one’s own and the other party’s outside options.16
The second key result is that the beneﬁts of requesting a referral accrue equally to all
buyers. We have argued in section 3.1 that a referral from an online buying service lowers
prices at a dealer because of the implicit threat to direct customers to the dealer’s competitors.
Consistent with our ﬁndings, if this threat operates, it seems reasonable that it should apply
uniformly across consumers.
It is important to note that our result that buyers who like the bargaining process do not
beneﬁt from being informed is not speciﬁc to the Internet speciﬁcation: we repeat the basic
Informed speciﬁcation from column 7 of Table 2 with the DislikeBargaining dummy and the
interaction of the dummy with Informed.17 We ﬁnd that consumers who DislikeBargaining pay
2.6% more than consumers who do not (see column 3 in Table 3). We ﬁnd the same qualitative
16For example, being able to negotiate a salary raise after having received a competing job oﬀer is not a sign
of good bargaining skills. However, negotiating a raise without such an oﬀer may very well be.
17We construct the dummy according to the ﬁrst approach in this subsection.
25result as in our two Internet speciﬁcations, namely that the beneﬁts of being Informed accrues
only to consumers who dislike bargaining (by 2.0%).
Finally, if a subset of consumers gain disproportionately from using the Internet to buy a
car, economic theory suggests that this group should be disproportionately likely to use the
Internet. Our ﬁnal speciﬁcation in Table 3 is a probit that relates a buyer’s decision to use the
Internet the consumer trait measures constructed in the factor analysis. We ﬁnd that buyers
with a higher disutility from the bargaining process are more likely to use the Internet.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we use direct measures of search behavior and consumer characteristics in the car
industry to investigate how the Internet aﬀects negotiated prices in car retailing. We match
transaction data on 1,500 car purchases in California with the responses to a survey which
asks buyers detailed questions about their Internet usage, their attitudes towards information
search and bargaining, and their demographics.
Our survey data enable us to control directly, at an individual level, for heterogeneity in
attitudes towards search and bargaining disutility. While these controls cannot fully rule out
selection bias, they increase our conﬁdence that the price eﬀects are not an artifact of diﬀerences
in unobserved characteristics between people who use the Internet and those who do not.
We show that the Internet lowers prices for two distinct reasons. First, the Internet informs
consumers. The information that seems to be most valuable to consumers is the invoice price of
the dealer; it enables them to negotiate a low price at a given dealership. Internet information
seems not to help consumers ﬁnd low-price dealerships. In particular, the Internet does not
substitute for searching at multiple dealers. Nor does searching at multiple dealers substitute
for being better informed.
Second, the incentives provided by online buying services’ contracts with dealerships help
26consumers obtain lower prices through a referral process. Referrals from manufacturer web-
sites do not lower prices. We believe that online buying services are more eﬀective because,
unlike manufacturers, they can exert pressure on dealers by directing incremental business to
aﬃliated—and away from unaﬃliated—dealerships. The magnitude of the combined informa-
tion and referral eﬀect of the Internet is 1.5% of the purchase price, or 22% of dealers’s average
gross proﬁt margin.
We ﬁnd that the beneﬁt of gathering information diﬀers by consumer type. While buyers
with a high disutility of bargaining pay 1.5% less when they have collected information on the
speciﬁc car they eventually purchase, buyers who like the bargaining process do not beneﬁt
from such information.
The point estimate of the combined information and referral price eﬀects is close to the esti-
mate of Zettelmeyer, Scott Morton, and Silva-Risso (2004). They found that, after controlling
for selection, Autobytel.com lowered prices by 2.2%. Since Autobytel.com is a major online
buying service, we can compare this estimate with the sum of our InternetUse and OBSReferral
coeﬃcients in the last subsection, 1.5%, or with the estimate of 2.2 to 2.5% for consumers with
a high disutility from bargaining. The similarity of the coeﬃcient estimates is remarkable given
that Zettelmeyer, Scott Morton, and Silva-Risso (2004) use data from 1999, the height of the
Internet boom and a time of experimentation by both consumers and retailers. In contrast,
the data in this paper are from April and May of 2002, when the Internet had become more
mainstream.
More generally, the results in this paper suggest that the decisions consumers make to
use the Internet to gather information and to use the negotiating clout of an online buying
service have a real eﬀect on the prices paid by these consumers. The results speak both to
the signiﬁcance of the Internet in making information more easily available, and also to the
potential of Internet institutions to aﬀect the distribution of surplus even in established oﬄine
industries like auto retailing.
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29Table 1: Summary Statistics†
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Demographic Variables From Survey
Age 1436 3.03 0.91 1.00 5.00
Education 1436 4.82 1.44 1.00 7.00
Income 1436 5.18 2.19 1.00 10.00
Black 1436 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00
Hispanic 1436 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Female 1436 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
Demographic Variables From Census
%HouseOwnership 1436 0.67 0.24 0.01 1.00
MedianHouseValue 1436 2.28 1.06 0.19 5.00
%Professional 1436 0.16 0.08 0.00 0.62
%Executives 1436 0.17 0.08 0.00 1.00
%BlueCollar 1436 0.27 0.16 0.00 0.91
%Technicians 1436 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.16
Summary Statistics from Transaction Data
Price 1436 23284.92 5499.61 9800 38750
TradeIn 1436 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
EndOfMonth 1436 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Weekend 1436 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
Competition 1436 4.50 3.06 0.00 16.00
MonthMay 1436 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
SouthernCal 1436 0.62 0.48 0.00 1.00
† Age, education, income represent response categories.
MedianHouseValue in $100,000.
Competition: number of dealers of same nameplate in a 10 mile
radius of dealership.
30Table 2: Price eﬀects of search and purchasing behavior†
Dep. Var. ln(price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)




























AfraidTakenAdv. 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.44
(0.13)∗∗ (0.13)∗∗ (0.13)∗∗ (0.13)∗∗ (0.13)∗∗ (0.13)∗∗
NoTimeToShop 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.21 0.19 0.18
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
DoPriceComparis. −0.39 −0.31 −0.36 −0.31 −0.32 −0.26
(0.23)+ (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
InternetForInfo 0.01 −0.17 −0.14 −0.09 0.04 −0.09
(0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.16)
GatherMuchInfo −0.25 −0.28 −0.26 −0.24 −0.23 −0.24
(0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21)
ReadCarMagazine 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.28 0.24 0.25
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)+ (0.17) (0.17)
VisitDealerForFun −0.10 −0.10 −0.11 −0.11 −0.13 −0.13
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
CustomerAge −0.13 −0.12 −0.09 −0.13 −0.11 −0.12 −0.10
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
Education −0.41 −0.39 −0.39 −0.41 −0.38 −0.39 −0.39
(0.10)∗∗ (0.10)∗∗ (0.10)∗∗ (0.10)∗∗ (0.10)∗∗ (0.10)∗∗ (0.10)∗∗
Income −0.23 −0.20 −0.20 −0.25 −0.20 −0.20 −0.20
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Income
2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.02)+ (0.02)+ (0.02)+ (0.02)∗ (0.02)∗ (0.02)+ (0.02)+
Black 0.52 0.69 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.66
(0.88) (0.87) (0.87) (0.87) (0.87) (0.87) (0.87)
Hispanic 0.37 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.50 0.41 0.41
(0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38)
OtherRace 0.24 0.28 0.31 0.20 0.34 0.27 0.30
(0.44) (0.42) (0.42) (0.44) (0.43) (0.42) (0.43)
Female 0.48 0.32 0.31 0.25 0.32 0.32 0.31
(0.26)+ (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Constant 1,007.30 1,007.09 1,007.18 1,007.14 1,007.62 1,007.62 1,007.71
(1.43)∗∗ (1.75)∗∗ (1.76)∗∗ (1.77)∗∗ (1.76)∗∗ (1.77)∗∗ (1.77)∗∗
Car Fixed Eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1436 1436 1436 1419 1435 1435 1435
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97
∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%; + signiﬁcant at 10% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
† Unreported are car, month, and region ﬁxed eﬀects, EndOfMonth, Weekend, TradeIn, Competition, VehicleCost, and
census demographics.
Response scale on trait variables is 1=”Disagree Strongly”, 4=”Agree Strongly.”
All coeﬃcients are multiplied by 100.
31Table 3: Price eﬀects by bargaining disutility and Probit on Internet use†
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Var. ln(price) ln(price) ln(price) InternetUse
InternetUse 0.17 0.06
(0.48) (0.42)






























CustomerAge -0.07 -0.10 -0.04 -0.22
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.05)**
Education -0.39 -0.38 -0.39 0.06
(0.10)** (0.10)** (0.10)** (0.03)*
Income -0.21 -0.18 -0.20 0.02
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.09)
Income
2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01
(0.02)+ (0.02)+ (0.02)+ (0.01)
Black 0.75 0.69 0.67 0.03
(0.87) (0.87) (0.86) (0.23)
Hispanic 0.42 0.38 0.39 -0.36
(0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.11)**
OtherRace 0.36 0.36 0.42 -0.02
(0.43) (0.43) (0.42) (0.20)
Female 0.39 0.34 0.38 -0.02
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.09)
Constant 1,007.80 1,006.60 1,007.93 0.94
(1.75)** (1.52)** (1.77)** (0.48)*
Car Fixed Eﬀects yes yes yes no
Observations 1435 1435 1435 1436
R-squared 0.97 0.97 0.97
∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ** signiﬁcant at 1%; + signiﬁcant at 10% level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. All coeﬃcients are multiplied by 100.
† Unreported are (columns 1-3) car, month, and region ﬁxed eﬀects, EndOfMonth, Weekend, TradeIn,
Competition, VehicleCost, and (columns 1-4) census demographics.
Response scale on trait variables 1=”Disagree Strongly”, 4=”Agree Strongly.”
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